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Siegen für Deutschland? Patriotism, Nationalism and 
the German National Football Team, 1954-2014 
Kay Schiller ∗ 
Abstract: »Siegen für Deutschland? Patriotismus, Nationalismus und die Deut-
sche Fußball-Nationalmannschaft 1954-2014«. This article discusses the rela-
tionship between expressions of patriotism, nationalism and national identity 
and the fortunes of the German national football team by examining develop-
ments from the 1950s until the present. It analyses the varying degrees of 
identification of the Germans with their national team from the wave of en-
thusiasm that greeted the 1954 World Cup win to the more sober reception the 
team received thereafter which climaxed in the ‘denationalization’ of the na-
tional team during the 1974 World Cup. It then explains the renationalization 
of discourses and practices associated with the team from the late 1980s on-
wards to end with a discussion of the ‘partyotism’ during the 2006, 2010 and 
2014 World Cups. The article argues that while the identification of the Ger-
mans with their national football team is a useful indicator of more general 
historical and cultural trends, one should not overestimate its relevance for de-
termining the degree of nationalism in German society. 
Keywords: Germany, football, nationalism, patriotism, national team, 1954, 
1974, 2006, 2010, 2014. 
1.  Introduction 
Eins und zwei und drei und ’54, ’74, ’90, 2010 
Ja so stimmen wir alle ein 
Mit dem Herz in der Hand und der Leidenschaft im Bein 
Werden wir Weltmeister sein 
One and two and three and ’54, ’74, ’90, 2010 
Yes, so we all sing 
With our hearts in our hands and passion in our legs 
We shall be world champions 
Sportfreunde Stiller  
(Originally written for the 2006 World Cup, text edited in 2010) 
While the German national football team advanced no further than the semi-
finals during the FIFA World Cup in 2006, which Germany hosted, the country 
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surprised itself and the world with a good-natured, festive and light-hearted 
patriotism during what was dubbed the ‘summer fairy-tale’ of June and July of 
that year. Think about the ubiquitous displays of the German colours in the public 
sphere, from flags on houses and in apartment windows and on cars, to black, red 
and gold bikini tops for car wing mirrors, to scarves, shirts, wigs, funny hats, 
Hawaiian flower necklaces, face-paint etc. in the German colours during street 
parties, at motorcades, at ‘public viewings’ in many towns and cities and, most 
prominently, with up to a million fans congregating during Germany games and 
celebrating on the ‘fan mile’ in Berlin which extended from the Brandenburg 
Gate to the Victory Column. Since then expressions of German ‘banal national-
ism’ (Billig 1995) have become increasingly normal. They have been repeated 
during the European football championships in 2008 and 2012 and the 2010 
and 2014 tournaments in South Africa and Brazil and, to a lesser degree, the 
2007 Handball World Championships and the FIFA Women’s Football World 
Cup in 2011, both of which were also hosted in Germany. 
These expressions of a patriotisme bon-enfant (French newspaper Le Monde, 
quoted in Raithel 2014, 364) and ‘partyotism’ (Wollenhaupt 2009) have led to a 
number of arguments and questions. For example, whether what one observed in 
terms of a self-confident and creative display and therefore positive identification 
with the symbols of the German nation on occasion of the World Cup finals in 
Germany and South Africa was ‘new’ and different from German nationalism 
of earlier times? Was it a sign of the country’s normality vis-à-vis other nations 
some sixty years after the end of National Socialism?  
Needless to say that this is how the German grand coalition government under 
Angela Merkel wanted to portray the phenomenon (Bundesregierung 2006). Was 
this a ‘benevolent patriotism’ as opposed to an ‘aggressive nationalism’? In an 
analysis of political attitudes in the US, social psychologists Rick Kosterman and 
Seymour Feshbach distinguished the two by defining nationalism as reflecting an 
‘apperception of national superiority and an orientation toward national domi-
nance’; whereas patriotism relates to ‘the affective component of one’s feeling 
towards one’s country [...] It assesses the degree of love and pride in one’s na-
tion’ (1989, 271). Related to this question, another one arose: Was the positive 
identification with players of African, Turkish or Polish ethnic background like 
Jerome Boateng, Sami Khedira, Mesut Özil, Lukas Podolski or Miroslav Klose 
indicative of the Germans’ acceptance that theirs is a multi-ethnic nation, per-
haps even of a German endorsement of multiculturalism?  
And, was it possible to draw more general conclusions from the behaviour 
of these crowds about the general population’s attitude toward the nation? More 
generally, how deeply rooted are shifts in the expression of nationalist sentiment 
on occasion of football tournaments in the national psyche? Was this more than 
just short-lived euphoria, even though it has been claimed that euphoria is ‘a 
well-known element of sports nationalism’ (Goksøyr 2010, 278)? Is football 
history therefore indeed a ‘good seismograph for changes in [the] cultural tec-
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tonics’ (Pyta 2006, 19) of nations? And are these expressions of ‘banal nation-
alism,’ which are not limited to Germany but an international phenomenon, 
significant building blocks for a positive identification with the nation?  
Or: Is this enthusiasm for the national team and the national symbols per-
haps no more than a fleeting fad, a way for the nation to have a further carnival, 
a party and festive celebration, here today and gone and forgotten tomorrow, 
the day after or, at the very latest, a few years later? For the latter outcome, 
consider the example of the French national team at the World Cups in 1998 
and in 2010. In 1998 winning with a black-blanc-beur team was accompanied 
by a wave of enthusiasm for ‘Zizou’ Zidane and the multiethnic France he 
symbolized in the eyes of the public. It has been argued that the event helped in 
reducing ethnic tensions and unified the nation (Dauncey and Hare 1999; Du-
bois 2011; Sonntag 2014). When France embarrassingly went out of the tour-
nament at the group stages in the 2010 World Cup, however, the praise for the 
players of (North-)African descent was turned on its head. The French public 
did not hold the French Football Association responsible which stuck with 
Coach Raymond Domenech who had obviously lost the confidence of the 
players during a lacklustre qualification campaign. Rather, the blame was laid 
squarely at the doors of the black and beur players who had been feted so exu-
berantly twelve years earlier. The media and a large part of the political and 
intellectual establishment saw in them, and especially in Florent Malouda and 
Nikolas Anelka, the brothers of the ghetto kids who had rioted in the banlieus 
in 2005, overpaid and with no respect for authority, nor a sense of duty towards 
the nation at large. It was as if the 1998 World Cup had never happened.  
In the German case as well there is evidence to suggest that anti-foreigner 
sentiment in general did not decrease as a result of the 2006 World Cup. The 
sociologists around Wilhelm Heitmeyer argue in their longitudinal study 
Deutsche Zustände (German Conditions) that other factors, such as September 
11, the Hartz IV legislation that dramatically limited access to social security in 
the Federal Republic after 2005 and the various economic crises since 2008 
were much more important than the national team. These problems led to in-
creases in day-to-day intolerance and prejudice against ethnic minorities in 
Germany (especially Heitmeyer 2006, 2011). The multi-ethnic composition of 
the national team and the party-atmosphere at the ‘public viewings’ therefore 
did not have any positive effect.  
In the following I will try to find some answers for the above questions by 
tracing the development of German national identity and football nationalism 
through a few episodes of the history of the German national football team in 
the post-war era. The analysis will show that the relationship between the na-
tional team and German national identity was never straightforward and un-
complicated. Moreover, the analysis will demonstrate that episodes of close-
ness between the nation and the team alternated with periods of greater 
emotional distance. These were felt not only by the spectators but the players as 
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well. In this fashion the relationship between the nation and the national team 
reflected more general trends in German society.  
2.  The ‘Miracle of Berne’  
The event which until this day seems to be of crucial importance in investing 
football in post-war Germany with a meaning beyond sport for national identity 
was the so-called ‘miracle of Berne.’ This was the World Cup final on 4 July 
1954 which West Germany won 3:2 and turned the Wankdorf Stadium in the 
Swiss capital into a German lieu de mémoire. In spite of later understandings 
which emphasized the ‘miraculous’ nature of this football victory vis-á-vis the 
German military defeat in World War II, the outcome of the final was under-
stood originally purely as a ‘miracle’ in football terms (Schmitz-Dräger 2011, 
43). This was because the underdog had beaten the favourite and the West 
German team had come back from two goals down against a Hungarian team 
hitherto considered invincible. At the time the Hungarians around their star 
player Ferenc Puskás were the best team in the world. In 1953 they had 
achieved the hitherto unthinkable by demolishing England at home, previously 
unbeaten at Wembley, 6:3 and by inflicting England’s heaviest defeat ever in 
Budapest with 7:1 just before the 1954 World Cup. And they had convincingly 
beaten the West Germans 8:3 at an earlier stage during the 1954 tournament. 
While the beginnings of the 1954 World Cup tournament were barely fol-
lowed in Germany, the further the team progressed, the more interested Ger-
man audiences both in the Federal Republic and the GDR became. Not only 
was there an increasing flood of Germans into Switzerland attending the 
matches of the team, the final was the first sports spectacle in Germany which 
was also a major media event. Neither Max Schmeling knocking out Joe Louis 
in their world heavyweight bout in 1936, nor the Berlin Olympics of the same 
year commanded similar public attention. With only 30.000 television sets for 
all of the Federal Republic in 1954, the importance of the new medium was 
still limited, but towns were virtually deserted on that Sunday afternoon in July, 
as Germans East and West were listening on the radio (Brüggemeier 2004, 
210-2). With Herbert Zimmermann’s last words during the radio broadcast of 
the match (‘Over, over, Germany are World Champions! You may think that 
I’m crazy, think that I lost my marbles...’) over time acquiring a prominent 
position in popular memory, from then on football and the audiovisual media 
entered into a close alliance, each aiding in the other’s meteoric rise during the 
post-war era (Pyta 2006, 11).  
The victory was accompanied by a wave of national enthusiasm which 
found expression in the exuberant welcome the team received in the Federal 
Republic upon its return. In celebrations similar to those on occasion of the 
arrival of newly crowned monarchs at their residence, thousands stood by the 
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train tracks from the Swiss-German border onwards, tens of thousands crowded 
stations in the South-West of Germany whenever the ‘Red flash,’ the special 
train bringing home the team, stopped (Herzog 2014, 136). Players were then 
regaled with goods ranging from foodstuffs to sewing machines to Goggo 
motor scooters (Frei 1994, 191-3). And hundreds of thousands gathered in the 
centre of Munich where the team was officially welcomed by Bavarian Minis-
ter President Hans Ehard. The mass-circulation daily tabloid BILD-Zeitung 
headlined ‘Simply great: Munich exploded with joy’ or ‘Upon arrival in Mu-
nich: jubilation upon jubilation’ (Schmitz-Dräger 2011, 43).  
In his cultural history of the 1954 World Cup finals Franz Brüggemeier 
stresses that the national enthusiasm that accompanied the football success was 
a short-lived affair and that therefore he could not agree with claims that ‘win-
ning the title was experienced as compensation for the lost war, contributed to a 
new national identity and to the emotional foundation of the Federal Republic’ 
(2004, 328). The Freiburg historian rightly warns of the danger of anachronism, 
of ex-post-facto readings that contribute little to how an event was understood 
at the time. On the other hand, while this wave of national enthusiasm was as 
intense as short, its relevance should not be denied either. Arguably, it filled a 
symbolic void for a republic which suffered from an obvious lack of symbols 
in the early Adenauer years (Pyta 2006, 13). And other than the World Cup 
victory there was little else which offered itself to the Germans for a positive 
collective identification with the nation in the period before economic prosperi-
ty and mass consumption really took off.  
The encoding of the victory in the media and popular culture as a result of the 
players’ faithful adherence to the nation and their male comradeship resonated 
with collective attitudes. It fitted well with the popular perception of the ordinary 
German soldier, the Landser, who had remained loyal to the nation and his com-
rades despite having been betrayed by the military and political leadership. While 
military heroes were no longer in demand after 1945, character traits like disci-
pline, perseverance, toughness, combativeness and the ideal of male comradeship 
survived the war intact and served as an important ingredient for the reshaping of 
national identity (Knoch 2002, 125). The Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the 
biggest paper in the Ruhr, explained the success in no uncertain terms: ‘A team 
of eleven comrades fighting unquestioningly did it’ (Pyta 2006, 12). In the same 
vain, BILD wrote that the men did ‘not give up the fight’ in the ‘battle of Bern.’ 
‘They fought like only men can fight’ (Schmitz-Dräger 2011, 42).  
Moreover, the public’s identification with the team was facilitated by the 
fact that in the 1950s the players’ socio-economic position roughly reflected 
that of the German population at large. Despite some of the players around 
team captain Fritz Walter becoming stars in the wake of the 1954 success, their 
income from football remained small and they could not be suspected to play 
for financial reward, not least because of the German FA’s (Deutscher Fußball-
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Bund, DFB) reticence to fully professionalise elite football (Eggers 2004; 
Havemann 2013). 
It is true that in the aftermath of the victory most prominent politicians of 
the Federal Republic did their utmost to play down the success and avoided to 
interpret it in political let alone nationalist terms, with neither Adenauer nor 
Federal President Theodor Heuss congratulating the team with any real enthu-
siasm but rather, in the eyes of one historian, making a show of their lack of 
interest (Blasius 2001, 116). This was because at that point in time most politi-
cians and opinion leaders had yet to come to grips with the importance of foot-
ball symbolism for the national psyche.  
At the same time, the West German government minister responsible for 
sport, Interior Minister Gerhard Schröder, while tellingly preferring to attend 
the 1954 German Horse Racing Derby in Hamburg on the day of the final, 
officially welcomed the victorious team in Bonn. In his welcome address he 
quite adequately captured the mood and relevance of the event:  
There is great enthusiasm for football in Germany and therefore your victory 
in Berne has made such a strong impression on us. We are not as rich as other 
nations in terms of national events and symbols which provide a strong collec-
tive experience. Therefore we are all the more grateful for every event which 
mediates such a real sense of community to us (Raithel 2004, 161). 
It took time for this interpretation of 1954 to become widely accepted, through 
the passing on of stories from one generation to the next of the communal 
experience of Zimmermann’s radio coverage, of watching the final at the local 
pub or peeking into the shop window of a radio and television seller with others 
or waiting for the ‘Red Flash.’ Over time the victory became a marker of Ger-
man national identity along with others, such as German pacifism and econom-
ic might as well as European integration.  
3.  The 1974 World Cup and the Denationalization of 
Football Symbolism 
In the aftermath of the famous 1954 victory the West German football team 
experienced a period of relative decline, with humiliating defeats against Bel-
gium and France as early as late 1954 and drubbings by lowly Switzerland and 
Ireland in 1956. England convincingly beat the West Germans twice in 1954 and 
1956, a trip to Moscow in 1955 which against the DFB’s intentions became 
heavily politicized due to the forthcoming high-profile Adenauer visit in the 
Soviet capital in August 1955 also ended in a defeat (Dahlmann 2010).  
In the 1958 World Cup the team surprisingly reached the semi-final in the 
1958 but went out 1:3 against host Sweden. The match took place in Gothenburg 
in an overheated atmosphere which was poisoned by anti-German polemics in the 
Swedish press. In the run-up to the game Dagens Nyheter had criticised the 
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German fans’ rowdy behaviour during the tournament, their excessive alcohol 
consumption and their ostentatious waving of Germany flags. The stadium in 
Gothenburg was filled with hostile local crowds. There were Heja Sverige 
cheerleaders armed with megaphones by the touchlines to whip up a frenzy and 
to unnerve the West German team, a practice later banned by FIFA (Andersson 
2014, 158). The Swedes won after getting a German player sent off through 
constant provocation and injuring Fritz Walter, then still the team’s most im-
portant player. Mirroring a trend of seeing Germans as victims rather than perpe-
trators which was characteristic of the 1950s, one German paper asked in the 
aftermath: ‘What have we done to the Swedes? In both wars, no German soldier 
even set foot on Swedish soil’ (Hesse-Lichtenberger 2003, 139). For a while 
afterwards this was not a good time for Swedish tourists to vacation in Germany. 
The DFB refused to even play Sweden for the next five years and the national 
enthusiasm that had greeted the 1954 victory became a distant memory.  
Over the next decade or so football symbolism in West Germany became 
‘denationalized,’ a process probably also due to the fact that the national team 
had no great successes to celebrate. This ‘denationalization’ expressed itself in 
various ways. There was firstly an increasing reticence among players and the 
public alike to sing the national anthem and wave the German flag. Crowd 
behaviour at the matches of the national team became increasingly quiet and 
subdued. Despite the fact that it is etched into German collective memory, 
neither Geoff Hurst’s famous 1966 second goal that never was, nor the defeat 
at the hands of the Azzurri in the 1970 semi-final in the ‘greatest game of all 
time’ (L’Equipe) was accompanied by much national fervour or lamentation. It 
is true that during the 1972 finals of the European Championship incidents of 
German hooliganism in Belgian cities made the news. When the West German 
team won the title by demolishing the Soviet team 3:0 in the final (after beating 
England for the first time ever at Wembley in the quarter-finals), fans rioted on 
the streets of Brussels and other Belgian cities with chants like ‘I, A, O, the 
Ivan goes KO’ (Schulze-Marmeling 2004, 251).  
One might argue though that these ugly scenes owed more to excessive 
drink than to nationalism. Of course, it is safe to assume that the prototypical 
football fans had fewer problems with the nation than other Germans and did 
not feel particularly burdened by German history but proud of the national 
team. However, they usually did not show their allegiance quite so openly. 
Some of this was due to nationalism per se losing its attractiveness in West 
Germany’s booming consumer society. Moreover, while the introduction of the 
Bundesliga in 1963 laid the foundations for successes of the national team on 
the international stage like the European Championships in 1972, the estab-
lishment of the professional league went hand in hand with a reinforcement of 
the traditional regional roots of German football rather than resulting in a 
strengthening of German football nationalism (Pyta 2006, 16).  
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The denationalization of national team symbolism reached its peak with the 
1974 World Cup hosted by Germany. An important contributory factor in this 
regard was probably the internationalist orientation of the Munich Olympics 
two years earlier. Whereas the 1954 World Cup title came to be remembered as 
a nationalist revival, the 1972 Olympic Games stood for the polar opposite. For 
the Germans they symbolically marked the country’s return to full participation 
in the international community. This internationalizing trend was then contin-
ued, if at a lower level, at the World Cup. However, while the Olympic Games 
had been used to present an optimistic and modern Germany to the world 
(Schiller and Young 2010), the World Cup, a sport spectacle that historically 
lent itself less easily to symbolic exploitation than the Games, was a sober and 
restrained event in comparison. The journalist Ulfert Schröder described this 
fittingly at the time when observing the spectators: ‘In the German stadia the 
spectators remain spectators, they remain at a distance, are kept away in the 
proper sense. They are meant to watch but ought to only get a faint idea of the 
struggle’ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 11, 1974). 
The broadcasts of World Cup matches of the West German team were also 
rather sober and subdued affairs. When Paul Breitner converted the penalty in 
the World Cup final against Holland without much further ado, Rudi Michels, 
the commentator for German state television ARD, calmly suggested: ‘Look, 
ladies and gentlemen, if Breitner keeps his nerve and takes on this task in the 
24th minute at 1:0 down, we have to be able to do the same. Goal!’ (quoted in 
Körner 2006, 178). This was miles away from the emotional outbursts of Her-
bert Zimmermann on the radio twenty years earlier. There is truth to the sug-
gestion that the Germans at the time ‘feared all kinds of extremes, all raving 
seemed suspicious, especially if it could be construed as nationalistic’ (Körner 
2006, 178). Not even winning the title against the favourite Holland sparked 
much national enthusiasm. According to Christiane Eisenberg this was because 
nationalist outbursts were generally frowned upon due to the legacy of the 
student movement and the politics of détente pursued by Willy Brandt’s social-
liberal coalition (1997, 121). And there were a few additional circumstances 
which encouraged a sober reception by the public, including the awful weather 
which made this World Cup the wettest of all times. The latter probably had a 
dampening effect on the public mood at a time when none of the football stadia 
were fully covered by roofs.  
More importantly, by 1974 the Federal Republic had also entered a differ-
ent, less optimistic phase of its history. In 1974 the mood was subdued, not 
least because of the continued terrorism threat which had blighted the Munich 
Games and the economic malaise of the 1970s. The trente glorieuse with stable 
growth and low unemployment came to an end with the first oil price shock of 
1973. When describing the ‘post-boom’ era, Tim Schanetzky speaks of a ‘great 
sobering’ (2007), Konrad Jarausch of ‘the end of optimism’ (2008). These were 
the twilight years of the social-liberal reform era with the pragmatic ‘crisis 
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manager’ Helmut Schmidt replacing the political visionary Brandt. One need 
not go as far as claiming that the pragmatic and result-oriented style of football 
the West German national team played in 1974 was the equivalent of the new 
chancellor’s policies (Seitz 1987, 98-103). But it is clear that the title was won 
primarily because the team remained cool when it mattered, stuck to its guns 
and was determined to exploit every weakness of their opponents (Gebauer 
2006, 170). As opposed to the European Championships in 1972 which the 
West Germans won with flair and panache, in 1974 Holland played the more 
technically and tactically refined, in short, more beautiful football, and cap-
tured the sympathies of most neutral observers. 
Rather than the World Cup final it was the extraordinary match against the 
GDR in Hamburg on 20 June 1974, the only ever encounter between the two 
German national teams at the finals of a major tournament, which gave rise to 
expressions of German football nationalism. Footage of the event in Hamburg 
shows many in the audience waving national flags and engaging in loud ‘Ger-
many, Germany’ chants. Nevertheless, the 1:0 victory of the underdog against 
the favourite was generally accepted without much lamentation in the Federal 
Republic, not least because both teams had already qualified for the next round. 
The reaction in East Germany was equally unspectacular. While the unexpected 
victory filled many GDR football fans with pride, the authorities of the state and 
the party were unprepared to exploit it for propaganda purposes. When West 
Germany won the title, quite a few East Germans also celebrated, though not 
publicly as opposed to twenty years earlier due to the fear of reprisals. However, 
both ‘national’ loyalties were not mutually exclusive. On the one hand fans were 
happy when football ‘Goliath’ West Germany was given a kicking by ‘David’ 
GDR, on the other when the ‘brothers’ in the West managed to win the World 
Cup, this was also cause for celebration in the East (McDougall 2014).  
Two further developments of the 1960s and early 1970s merit attention. 
Firstly, along with denationalization of football symbolism came the rise of the 
modern professional in Germany like elsewhere in Western Europe, that is, a 
new generation of players, who, as Richard Giulianotti put it, ‘acquired a “lei-
sure class” status, characterized by high disposable income, plenty of free time 
and a penchant for conspicuous consumption’ (1999, 113). Both Franz Becken-
bauer of Bayern Munich and Günter Netzer of Borussia Mönchengladbach along 
with other high-profile teammates in the national side fitted the bill. In line with 
broader international trends they became stars like rock musicians who not least 
through their glamorous ‘rich-and-famous’ lifestyle provided alternative modes 
of identification for spectators and fans (Rowe 1995). They replaced an older 
player type personified by Uwe Seeler. A fair and hard-working player like the 
Hamburg SV striker who never left this club and played at four consecutive 
World Cups from 1958 to 1970 was portrayed by the media not unlike members 
of the 1954 team as representative of the work ethos of the West German popu-
lation during the ‘economic miracle.’ Called Uns Uwe (Our Uwe), that is, ‘one 
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of us,’ Seeler refused lucrative contract offers from Italy and became some-
thing of a national treasure. Arguably, he provided a symbolic link between the 
hard labours of national reconstruction and the comfortable consumerism of the 
new prosperity in the Federal Republic. Originally hailing from a very modest 
social background – his father was a labourer in Hamburg harbour – he fitting-
ly followed his football years as the owner of a men’s fashion boutique which 
kitted out the German national team in 1974.  
Secondly, high-brow culture and football writers took a positive interest in 
the game for the first time. If the literature critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki had 
claimed in 1964 that literature and sports are brothers and enemies (feindliche 
Brüder) because sports is ‘so much simpler, more primitive, superficial and 
direct’ (Die Zeit, February 14, 1964), a few years later a number of authors no 
longer agreed. This was the period when Karl Heinz Bohrer praised the stylish 
and elegant play of the team around Beckenbauer and Netzer on the culture 
pages of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Bohrer famously coined the catch-
phrase of Netzer emerging ‘from the depth of space’ (aus der Tiefe des Raums) 
(1974, 89). Bohrer and others writers closely associated prominent football 
players with West Germany’s liberalization, the social and cultural upheavals 
of the 1960s and the ‘second foundation of the Federal Republic’ in ‘1968’ 
(Herbert 2002; Görtemaker 1999). In the process, Netzer, voted German Player 
of the Year in 1972 by sports journalists, was elevated to symbolic figure of a 
different Germany, a country in which the supposed national values of ‘fighting 
spirit and competitive strength’ (kämpferischer Einsatz und Leistungswillen) 
had been replaced by individualism and a willingness to speak one’s mind both 
on and off the pitch. The ‘rebel’ Netzer and the more mainstream Beckenbauer 
were therefore ‘destined to become a personified projection space for the cul-
tural upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s’ (Böttiger 2006, 20). 
Such assessments have since been repeated by football writers and histori-
ans alike, with Habbo Knoch going as far as to claim that Willy Brandt’s fa-
mous slogan ‘Dare more democracy’ found its equivalent in German football in 
these players (2002, 132). In reality they were far from being ‘1968ers’ in the 
political sense. More accurately, football historian Rudolf Oswald has empha-
sized a paradigm change in the governing bodies of German football in the 
1960s which allowed for the ‘rise of the individual player personality’ which 
replaced the ‘football soldier’ of 1954 (2008, 307). Of course, the processes of 
liberalization and democratization which characterised the Federal Republic 
during the period 1960s and 1970s did not stop at the DFB and national team’s 
dugout either. Accordingly, when the 1954 World Cup-winning coach Sepp 
Herberger retired and passed the baton to his assistant Helmut Schön in 1964, 
the new national coach made it explicit that he wanted to create a team ‘made 
of talents, individualists and personalities’ rather than a Wehrmacht-style col-
lective (Havekost and Stahl 2006, 52). 
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Moreover, Beckenbauer became indeed a good example of the denationali-
zation of football symbolism in the 1960s and 1970s. A week after the final, 
Beckenbauer commented on the haggling between the national team and the 
German FA about the players’ bonus for winning the title. While a sum of 
several tens of thousands of deutschmarks per head was eventually agreed, the 
episode also did not lend itself to inspiring national enthusiasm. When asked by 
BILD whether the money was necessary for the players to feel motivated, the 
future figure head of the 2006 World Cup in Germany replied:  
Of course! The player needs to feel that he is worth something. Then he en-
joys playing. Whenever I hear this sh** that we should play for the honour or 
for the eagle on our chests, that’s a joke, and nobody believes in this any long-
er’ (BILD, July 15, 1974).  
And Beckenbauer was not alone with this opinion, he spoke for most of the 
team. And given the public reaction to winning the title, many Germans must 
have agreed with the last part of the statement.  
4.  The Renationalization of Football Symbolism 
When Hermann Neuberger, the DFB president and chief organizer of the 
World Cup looked back at the tournament in an address to the annual meeting 
of the German FA in October 1974, he expressed his irritation about the sober 
reception winning the title had received:  
Many people in the Federal Republic, even more so abroad, but certainly all of 
us have had to ask ourselves with bewilderment why people did not feel over-
joyed by the second win of a World Cup for German football. One could not feel 
everywhere – and especially not for any length of time – the exuberant joy of the 
days of the triumph in Berne. People asked everywhere whether one can no 
longer feel any real joy here and express it (quoted in Schiller 2014, 188).  
As the lack of identification with the success of the national team was not only 
felt by the German public but the players as well, Neuberger had copies of the 
national anthem distributed to the team ahead of each international game. On 
occasion of the 1986 World Cup the team jerseys then spotted a collar in the 
German colours black, red and gold. It is probably no coincidence that this coin-
cided with the conservative turn (Wende) during the early years of Helmut Kohl’s 
chancellorship who wanted Germans to develop a more relaxed attitude towards 
their nation’s past. Two years later then on occasion of the European Champion-
ships in Germany the players wore the German colours in broad stripes across 
their chests (Havemann 2014, 446-7). The players now also sang the national 
anthem rather than simply enduring it while chewing gum in front of the national 
television audience. Moreover, they started to ritually assure the press how very 
proud they were to play in the national colours (Eisenberg 1997, 122).  
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The final breakthrough of the new football nationalism came on occasion of 
the World Cup Final in Rome’s Olympic Stadium on 9 July 1990 on the eve of 
German reunification. Winning the World Cup trophy in combination with the 
euphoria of the German reunification process led to an explosion in the use of 
national symbols. Even in small towns and in what was still the GDR fans met 
on market places, formed motorcades, wore the team kit, had their faces deco-
rated with the national colours and celebrated in a joyful manner reminiscent of 
carnival (Bajohr 2010, 425). Waving the German flag and wearing the national 
kit now became the order of the day not only in the stadium but also in the 
public sphere before and after matches and during major tournaments. 
Arguably, outstanding successes in another sport also contributed to the re-
nationalization of football in Germany. Notably, Boris Becker’s triumphs at 
Wimbledon from the mid-1980s onwards and those of the German Davis Cup 
team, along with the successes of Michael Stich and Steffi Graf in the women’s 
game, made expressions of national pride in German achievements attractive, 
while turning tennis in Germany from an upper-class elite activity into a pas-
time for the masses (Blain and O’Donnell 1994, 261).  
Moreover, the international re-nationalization of football symbolism was an 
international trend. While Giulianotti and Robertson emphasise that ‘the game 
maintained its relevance to national vitality’ and ‘continued to ritualize national 
solidarity’ in the period from the late 1960s and early 2000s (2009, 23), it is 
probably more accurate to suggest that in the 1980s and 1990s a qualitative shift 
occurred in Europe. For example, in the 1970s it would have been unthinkable for 
players of the French national team to hold hands and sing the Marseillaise which 
is now the normal pre-match ritual. According to Anna Maike Buß the national 
football symbolism compensated for a Europe moving toward an ever closer 
union which ‘seem[ed] to reinforce national rivalries between [EU] member 
states in the realm of sports,’ especially after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1992 (2004, 219-20). This thesis goes hand in hand with Frank Bajohr’s sug-
gestion that the invention of the Champions League in the same year and the 
1995 Bosman ruling which led to an increased internationalization of European 
club football reinforced this re-nationalization trend (2010, 426).  
This new football nationalism was reinforced by the ‘springtime of nations’ 
which resulted from international developments like the collapse of com-
munism and the end of the Cold War. Therefore, it was not surprising that on 
the continent expressions of football nationalism became most pronounced in 
the new nations emerging from the seismic shifts of 1989/90. One telling ex-
pression of this which used the rhetoric of national superiority and war, howev-
er, was when in the run-up to the quarterfinal of Euro 1996 between Germany 
and Croatia, Croatian coach Miroslav Blažević stirred up nationalist emotions 
when announcing that the ‘German tanks and Stukas’ would be met by Croa-
tian ‘commando troops and kamikaze pilots’ (Oswald 2005, 87). In the event, 
the Croatian national team lost but carried by a wave of national enthusiasm it 
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achieved its best ever result at an international tournament a couple of years 
later, winning third place at the 1998 World Cup finals in France.  
Until this very day the Croatians usually play in kit that replicates their na-
tional flag and includes the šahovnika, the national coat of arms, the red-and-
white chessboard emblem which was also the symbol of the fascist Ustaše 
regime. Tellingly, football matches were also vital ingredients in the country’s 
bid for national sovereignty during the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. One of 
the opening salvos in the war against Serbia happened at Zagreb’s Maksimir 
Stadium on 13 May 1990 when the captain of Dinamo Zagreb, Zvonimir 
Boban, became a national hero by dropping a karate kick on a Serb policeman 
who beat a Dynamo fan during ethnic riots at a match against the Serb side Red 
Star Belgrade (Wilson 2006, 154).  
5.  Partyotism in 2006, 2010 and 2014 
Looking at the more recent developments in Germany on occasion of the 2006 
World Cup hosted by the country and those of 2010 in South Africa and 2014 
in Brazil, one cannot but notice that German football nationalism while build-
ing on the new acceptance of national symbols since the late 1980s has now 
entered yet another phase which is determined by factors which were previous-
ly of minor importance. Most importantly, this football nationalism/patriotism 
is no longer ethnically exclusive but for many goes hand with a positive ac-
ceptance of Germany as a multi-ethnic society by most fans which however 
should not be confused with an endorsement of multiculturalism. The ground 
for this was prepared by a combination of two factors: the ignominious first-
round exit from EURO 2000, a rare moment of football weakness of the na-
tional team at an important tournament and the reform of the Reich Citizenship 
Law of 1913 in 1998 by the red-green coalition government under Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder. While the former inspired the DFB to copy the French ex-
ample of developing youth football at the grassroots which had led to the 
World Cup success in 1998, the automatic consignment of dual citizenship to 
children born in Germany to immigrant families (subject to a final decision in 
favour of one citizenship before their twenty-third birthday) made it signifi-
cantly easier for players with a ‘migration background’ (Migrationshinter-
grund) to play for national football teams from a very young age.  
In reality the German national team was never ethnically homogenous 
throughout its history. Camillo Ugi, the most-capped German international of 
the pre-World War I era had an Italian father, Fritz Szepan and Ernst Kuzorra in 
the 1930s were Masurians, the 1954 German goalkeeper Toni Turek was of 
Czech descent and the Romanian-born Jupp Posipal could have conversed in 
fluent Hungarian with his opposite player in the 1954 final. Jürgen Grabowski 
and Pierre Littbarski of the 1974 and 1990 World Cup winning sides could 
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claim Poles among their ancestors (Schümer 2010, 65). What was new though 
in 2006 and 2010 was the explicitly positive acknowledgment of the ethnic 
descent of Lukas Podolski and Miroslav Klose, to name the two attackers who 
played in both tournaments, in the German public sphere. Ironically, ‘Poldi’ 
and ‘Miro,’ however, having been born into Polish citizenship, hail from 
Spätaussiedler families, immigrants who could claim patrilinear German de-
scent, and therefore became Germans as a result of Article 116 of the Basic 
Law (Urban 2011, 158-9). 
Following on from initiatives like ‘Say No to Racism’ which resulted from 
FIFA’s first-ever conference against racism in football in 2001, the German FA 
has dedicated significant resources to the promotion of ethnic tolerance and 
integration since the early 2000s. This started under the leadership of DFB 
President Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder and was given particular emphasis under 
his successor Theo Zwanziger and included financial and other support for a 
variety of grassroots initiatives against racism, as well as a frank and open 
assessment of the association’s own past under National Socialism. The latter 
led to Nils Havemann’s excellent 2005 study Fußball unterm Hakenkreuz 
(Football under the swastika) and the establishment of the annual Julius Hirsch 
Award for successful ‘integration initiatives’ in the same year. The award is 
named after ‘Julle’ Hirsch of Karlsruher FV and SpVgg Fürth, the first ever 
German-Jewish international who in 1943 was deported and murdered at 
Auschwitz. In 2014, for example, it went to the Schickeria fan group of Bayern 
Munich who helped to revive the memory of the club’s former Jewish president 
and refugee from Nazism Kurt Landauer and for making a stand against anti-
semitism and racism. A further good example of the German FA’s antiracism 
campaign was the 2009 TV spot shown before the games of the national team 
that featured a middle-aged multi-ethnic group of people enjoying a summer 
garden party. The spot was accompanied by the following voice-over: ‘What 
have all these people [Menschen] in common? Their children play for the Ger-
man national football team. DFB – mas integracion.’1 
The prime example of this positive attitude towards Germany as a multieth-
nic society is the way in which Mesut Özil, a third-generation immigrant of 
Turkish descent from Gelsenkirchen in the Ruhr and exceptionally gifted mid-
field player whose main football idol when growing up was Zidane is celebrat-
ed in Germany. Özil had his breakthrough on the international stage during the 
World Cup finals in South Africa. Having previously played for Schalke 04 
and Werder Bremen he signed for Real Madrid after the tournament and in 
2013 moved to Arsenal London. To an extent still unthinkable a decade ago, 
Özil, both a German citizen by birth who renounced his Turkish citizenship 
even earlier than required by the citizenship reform legislation and a practicing 
                                                             
1  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T3m4c8j780E>. 
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Muslim who recites the Quran before matches, is celebrated as a shining exam-
ple of the successful integration of a Turk into German society. In 2010 he 
received a Bambi award for this from publisher Hubert Burda, the greatest 
official accolade German mainstream popular culture has on offer. That he, 
along with most other players with a ‘migration background,’ does not sing the 
national anthem before a game and did not break out in jubilation when all but 
kicking Turkey out of the 2012 European Championships with a goal in an 
important qualifier, was widely accepted and probably even increased his stat-
ure in the eyes of the German public. It also assured that when playing in Po-
land and Ukraine during Euro 2012 the German team enjoyed the support of 
many of the three million German residents with origins in Turkey, as well as 
that of other minorities living in Germany.  
However, while his positive portrayal in the public sphere is indicative of a 
rising acceptance that German society has become multiethnic, this should not 
be confused with a positive endorsement of multiculturalism. Like in the Ger-
man FA’s television ad, the keyword usually used in relation to Özil is ‘integra-
tion,’ although as part of the international football jet set he has not lived in 
Germany for a very long time. In line with current policies and those of nation-
al governments in the recent past this does not imply that all cultures are valued 
equally but prioritizes assimilation into German culture and suggests no more 
than cultural peculiarities are tolerated as long as they do not threaten the pre-
dominance of German culture. German football thus reflects a ‘growing con-
cern with the integration of an increasingly heterogeneous society’ (Kraus and 
Schönwälder 2006, 202). 
Complementing this point, a recent long-term sociological study among 
Germans without a ‘migration background’ argues that ‘not patriotism per se, 
but primarily the support of democratic values’ reduces ethnic prejudice (Wag-
ner et al. 2012, 328). Its authors show that the borders between nationalism and 
patriotism are not so clearly demarcated and explicitly warn against political 
campaigns that would encourage patriotic attitudes. Moreover, as the studies of 
Heitmeyer’s research group demonstrate, political and economic factors which 
foster a sense of insecurity and precariousness in German society have a much 
greater, negative, impact on tolerance towards ethnic minorities. For the social 
psychologist Dagmar Schediwy, the displays of nationalism/patriotism during 
the public viewings which were encouraged by conservative media like BILD 
can only be understood if one recognizes their primary political function to 
paper over conflicts in German society (2012). 
Whether one agrees with these critical assessments or not, there can be no 
doubt that the acceptance of cultural differences is made easier if their repre-
sentatives contribute significantly to the nation’s success and play football with 
such skill as Özil which made the German Under-21 coach Horst Hrubesch 
declare: ‘Our Messi is called Özil’ (Schümer 2010, 58). German national team 
coach Jogi Löw summed up the midfielder’s role with the following words: ‘I 
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believe that Mesut is a perfect example of integration. He preserved his Muslim 
faith and Turkish culture but nevertheless he plays football for Germany. That 
is a great signal’ (BILD, October 9, 2010).  
However, in order to understand the new German football national-
ism/patriotism, a number of further developments need to be considered. The 
Second World War ended seventy years ago, the Nazis came to power in Ger-
many more than eighty years ago. It is therefore understandable that young 
Germans especially happily participate in what is after all an international 
trend, to use football games of the national team as an occasion to celebrate a 
positive sense of belonging to the nation. Moreover in the recent past, other, 
notably winter, sports have also led to exuberant expressions of patriotism. 
Prominent examples are the reactions to the outstanding performance of Ger-
man ski jumper Sven Hannawald at the Four Hills Tournament in 2001/02 and 
the enthusiasm for the regular German successes in the Biathlon. These argua-
bly reinforced the positive identification with the DFB eleven. 
Then there is the endorsement of the national football team by German poli-
ticians. Gone are the days when German chancellors from Adenauer to Schmidt 
routinely gave a miss to the opportunity of basking in the national football 
team’s glory. From Helmut Kohl’s dressing room visit on occasion of the 1990 
World Cup title onwards these have become the norm, with the current incum-
bent Angela Merkel making more of such occasions than her predecessors. 
Leaving the question of her understanding of the game aside, Merkel’s behav-
iour is probably also based on the recognition of a further important precondi-
tion for the new football nationalism, that is, the sport’s increased status and 
respectability. In fact, nowadays football has completely shaken off its former 
proletarian image and moved from the margins to the centre of modern mass 
culture. It is now popular throughout German society, having largely overcome 
whatever age, class and gender barriers existed in the past.  
This in turn means that football provides near limitless opportunities for 
commercial exploitation, with European championship and world cup tourna-
ments being especially important for the national team. If Eisenberg is correct 
in suggesting that the renationalization of football in Germany in 1990 was 
supply-led and had more to do with the business acumen of those selling na-
tional paraphernalia than German reunification (1997, 122), then the im-
portance of commercial forces for the current German football national-
ism/patriotism is even more obvious today. Arguably, the phenomenon is to a 
large extent driven by the close collaboration of commercial interest, PR, the 
media and politics, all of which meet with a receptive audience of Germans.  
One good example of this on occasion of the 2010 World Cup in South Af-
rica was the chart-topping song ‘Schland, oh Schland’ (a short form of the 
Deutschland chant at Germany games invented by ProSieben television talk 
show host Stefan Raab) to the melody of Lena’s Eurovision Song Contest-
winning hit ‘Satellite’ by the band Uwu Lena (a pun on Uwe Seeler, the sing-
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er’s name and the South African vuvuzela horns) which was popularized via 
YouTube.2 Another was Paul, the octopus and expert predictor of the 2010 
World Cup football results whose advertisement value before his death by 
natural causes was estimated by PR agencies to be in the region of 3.5 million 
Euros (Schümer 2010, 29).  
German historical memory of football events itself has recently become col-
onized by commercial interest. For example, it can be argued that the current 
recognition of the ‘miracle of Berne’ by the German public as a first fleeting 
expression of a positive national identity after 1945 has at least as much to do 
with its constant reactivation through television and film as with the passing on of 
memories connected to it from one generation to the next. This seems to be the 
lesson of the ceaseless repetition of imagery of the 1954 triumph in conjunction 
with excerpts from Zimmermann’s radio commentary in history entertainment 
television formats at each major international tournament and of the run-away 
success of Sönke Wortmann’s eponymous movie of 2004. In narrating a senti-
mental father-son story before the background of the World Cup, Wortmann 
presents in the Miracle of Berne ‘a harmonious image of Germany’s national 
identity which clearly has more to do with a post-unification longing for normali-
zation than it does with the reality of the 1950s’ (Cooke and Young 2006, 191). 
Tellingly, the premiere of the movie, which was watched by a total of six million 
cinema goers, was a high-profile social event attended by members of the elite of 
German culture, sports, the economy and politics, including Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder (Schiller 2014, 200). Its popularity continues until this very day, with 
a musical based on Wortmann’s screenplay premiering in Hamburg in 2014.  
The borders between popular culture and football have certainly become ev-
er more porous and it would be easy to find many more examples of this devel-
opment. One might even argue that as a by-product of football moving to the 
centre of public attention and due to its role for the entertainment industry, watch-
ing the sport has become secondary for large parts of the audience while games 
of the national team are nowadays primarily occasions for strangers to leave 
behind the boredom of everyday life and celebrate together in a carnival atmos-
phere. Experience teaches that whenever popular new leisure pursuits emerge, 
commercial interests are following not far behind. This is also the reason why, 
ever protective of its most lucrative product and the television, sponsorship and 
advertisement deals connected with it, FIFA decided to take control of the fan 
fests beginning with the 2010 World Cup. While these had originally emerged 
as local grassroots initiatives in Germany in 2006, in 2010 and 2014 the fan 
fests were centrally organized by FIFA marketing and extended from cities in 
South Africa and Brazil to major cities and capitals around the globe.  
                                                             
2  < http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bz0rLo_fhU>. 
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6.  Conclusion 
This leaves the question as to whether German audiences’ reactions to the for-
tunes of the national team football after the Second World War are good indica-
tors of the state of German national identity: from the post-Volksgemeinschaft 
wave of national pride that greeted the 1954 title, via the largely denationalized 
displays of football enthusiasm in the 1960s and 1970s, to the partyotism and 
‘patriotism lite’ of 2006, 2010 and 2014. Here the answer is less clear. Certainly, 
if one recognizes that the current football nationalism/patriotism is not to be 
understood in a narrow political fashion, then like its predecessors in the 1950s 
and 1970s it might well be representative of broader attitudes of the German 
population. However, one must be aware that ‘benevolent’ patriotism and anti-
immigrant feelings are not mutually exclusive, with multiculturalism in the 
German context existing as a discourse but not as a political and social reality 
(Kraus and Schönwälder 2006, 2002). Only a few weeks after the 2010 World 
Cup, Thilo Sarrazin’s book Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany is abolishing 
itself), whose racialist language and Social-Darwinist arguments come straight 
from the garbage heap of Germany history, became a bestseller. During EURO 
2012 the ‘old’ nationalism also reared its ugly head again during one of the 
matches of the national team at Lviv in Ukraine. Sieg, Sieg chants could be 
heard and some right-wing fans waved the Imperial War Flag.  
However, when it comes to the German national football team and its style 
of play as a ‘national style of action’ which according to Gunter Gebauer 
(2006) constantly creates and consolidates as well as represents national identi-
ty, there is reason to be optimistic. One might be heartened by the fact that the 
core values of the German game are no longer sacrifice, discipline, persever-
ance, team spirit, toughness and combativeness but rather that Spanish tiki-
taka, with quick, short passing, maintaining and quickly regaining possession 
and lots of movement was the model which won German football the 2014 
World Cup in Brazil – that is, if one agrees with Eric Hobsbawm’s observation 
on football and national identity that ‘[t]he imagined community of millions 
seems more real as a team of 11 named people’ (1991, 143).  
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